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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

PARLEY D. BfLLS,
l'laintiff and Appellant

v,_

'THE DENVl<JR & RIO GRANDE.:
"\VESTBHK R.~ILROAD COM-

Case K o. 9028

PANY, a corporation,

Defendant nnd Respondent.

BHJJ;_~F

OF APPELLANT

STAT.F~M.K~'I'

A.

OF THE CA:-lE

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The parties are referred to

fl::<

in the court 1Jelow.

All italks are ours.
Parley D. Bill::;, wa:o injured while engaged in the
performance of his duties as conductor on the 20th day
of April, 1955, when he was thrown to the floor oi tlw
caboose on defendant's freight train Extra #5501 East,

as said train

1m~

moving along defendant's east bound

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
mainline track at .Provo, "Ctah' (R' :!, 4, J~:2, J39).

Plaintiff filed his complaint in the Third J ndicial
District Court in and lor Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, on the 21st day of March 1958, alhoging that he
was an employee of The Denver & Rio Grande Western
ltailroad Company, a corporation; that he suffered certain injmies while in the course of his employment, that
his action was governed by the Federal J<::mployers'

Liability Act, 45 r.S.C.A. Section 51, et seq. and that
his injuries ·were caused in whole or in part by defend-

ant's negligence in subjecting the caboose to an unusually
violent jerk, and to a jerk that was not reasonably to
be expected by plaintiff. Plaintiff further alleged negligence on the part of defendant by virtue of the doctrine

of' Hes Ipsa Loquitur (R. 1, 2, and 3).
Defendant, by its answer, admitted its
existence, admitted that plaintiff's action was
suant to the Federal Bmployers' Liability
denied the other allegations of plaintiff's
(R. 4).

corporate
filed purAct, and
complaint

The case was tried before the Honorable Martin lL
Larson commencing on the 1st day of December, 1958.
The jury returned a six to two vcrdic·t of no cause of
adion (R. 58). Thereafter plaintiff filed a motion for
new trial which wa..s denied and the notice of appeal
wa.s filed on the 5th day of lllarch, 1959 (R. 60).
rpon admitted facts the remedy afforded plaintiff
is controlled by the Federal E1uployer.,;' Liability ~\.rt.
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Partieular attention is called to 45 L.S.L'.A. Hection 51
which establishes liability for injuries resulting "in whole
or in part" from negligenee of the (·arrier, J!J F.S.C.A.
Section 53 which provides that contributory negligence
of an employee shall not bar recovet)" but shall only
diminish the damages, and 45 U.H.C.A. Section 54 which
abolishes assumption of risk a,.; a df'feme.
B.

'l'HE F'ACTS

Plaintiff was 48 years of age at tile time of hi~
injuries. He had worked continuously for defendant as
a brakeman and condudor since September of 1921
(It 117). On the 20th da~- of April, 1H55, he was assigned
as conductor of an extra freight train seheduled to
leave Salt Lake City at 3:J5 P.M. with its ultimate
destination Helper, Utah. TilE' train consisted of a -±-unit
diesel, 112 empties, S loads, and a cabooi\l' (R 120).
The first stop 11as made at R-iverton, the next at Ameri
C'an Hork, and the train arrived at Pr-ovo on the eastbound
mainline traek at approximately 7 :00 P .P.L (R. 1 ~1, 1:.!~).
Plaintiff was riding the caboose. The stop waH "a ver~·
normal, gentle stop" (R. 12-+). Thereafter plaintiff went
to the yard offiC'e, delivered hi~ switch list and waybilh:,
and obtained a Jist of the cars to be picked up at Provo
(R. 125). He then advised head brakeman \\'onnaeotl
and rear brakeman Serassio of the switehing which wa~
to take place and returned to the caboo~(· for the purpocrr
of "·writing my train up" (R. 126).

The tracks involved were as follmn;: The Pacrtbouml
mainline track which extends in a general northerly-
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,<;outherlv direction· immediately to the ea8t of the east.
'
bound mainline trark and adja<.·,ent thereto, the westbound
mainline track; immediately to the east of the >ve;;tbound mainline track and adjacent thereto, the pocket
lnv·k; immediately to the east of the pocket traek and
numbered 1, :2, 3, 4, 5, G, 7, etc., and adjacent thereto,
a series or stomge tr*·ks; connecting ihc south ends
of the pocket track and tracks J, ~. :l, 4, 5, fi, I, etc. and
extending in a northeasterly-southwesterly direction, a
lead track which is referred to al.so a,<; a crossover
where it proceeds across the we~tbound mainline track
and connect::! to the eastbound mainline track (R. 1:2-±,
125).
The switching operation to be perrormed by plaintiff's crew was a~ follows: 30 cars IH'Je to be taken
off the head end of the train and set out on one of the
f!torage tracks heretofore mentioned. Other cars were
to be picked up on track No. 1 and placed at the head
end of the train (R. 122, 12.), 201). \Yonnacott and
Serassio were to handle these final ~"·itching operations
(H.

:!~0).

The ~top involved in the accident \Hls unneeessary.
The rear of the train, including- the eahoo~r. could have
been left on the east bound mainline track \1·hcre the
original stop had been mn<k. The engine and head end
ol' the train could have been cut off, moved ahead approximately 20 carlengths and backed U(:l't>~;:. the er·o~~OYt>r.
'l'he necessar)' switching operations could then lmn: been
performed, the engme and car~ moved forward across
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the crossover and backed to a coupling with the re::;t o['
the train (R. 215, 216). 1f this proccdmc had been followed the train could then have moved out of town

without another stop.
Krocscller, the engineer of plaintiff's e1·cw, admitted
the la::;t stop was unneces::;ary and that the switching
could have been accomplished without pulling the rear
or the train down and stopping (lt. 303, 304, 303). lie
also admitted that he had been adYised bcl'orehand that
the last stop was to be made (R. 305).
The brakemen, unbeknownst to plaintiff, nevertheless had the engineer pull the entire train which 1m~
over a mile in length, a di~tance o(' approximalelY :?II

carlcngths and then brought the movement to a o:top,
with the plaintiff loeatcd in the caboose doing his paper
work (R. 215, 216, 236). At thi~ time it >l'a~ gell.inp:
dark and the brakemen were using their lanterns for
signalling (R. 23fJ).
Although the evidence was in conflict on the w•int.
defendant introduced expert testimony to the effect that
such a movement and stop could not be made without
severe slnek adion occurring at the rear or the train
( [{. 305, 322).
After the train had moved pm-:sihly 15 earlengths,
plaintiff arose from his desk and stalied to wall' loward
the rear end of the caboose. His purpose was to detenrtine
whetl1er the rear brakeman had mounted the caboose and
whether the switche~ were lined proper!.'" as they Wl'l"l'
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leaving town. This ·wru; customary. Tl1e train \vas proC€Cding approximately 5 or 6 mile:;: an hour (R. 127).
Plaintiff described the stop as follows (R. 128):

"A. \Vcll, when I got about fifteen feet from
my desk the eahoose just stopped suddenly. There
was no motion at all. \V e just stopped dead still
and r was thrown backward onto the floor and
.skidded along the floor until I hit the end of the
rahoose.
"Q. How far did you move from the place
\d1ere you were located at the moment of this
::;topf

''A.

Approximately fifteen feet."

The stop was so violent that it threw all the papars
and manifest sheets to the floor of the eaboose (R. 129).

Plaintiff rurthcr testified that the amount of slack
action ·was not in aceordance with cu,;tomary and safe
railroading operation (R. 188, 189).
On direct examination Wonnacott deR(·ribed the slack
action as a "terrific run-in" (R. ~:2:1) and on ctws
examination he te~tifi.ed as follows (R. 22-!):

"Q. And slaek action, severe

~lack

action in
moves of thi~ kind is not at allnnu:sual, i~ iU
"A. \Yell, I wouldn't ~ny that. Thi~ was a
pretty severe one." (R. :226).
Again he testified: ''\Yell, I don't think it ~hould
have ('ome to that fast a stop." (R. 230).
Serassio testified that he VlRS standing near wlwr<'
the clearan('(' point would be and was ;;i.gnaling directly
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to the engmeer (H. 24-l-). When the train reached tlw
point ·where the stop was to be made he gave an ea:;y
t;ign and then a stop sign. The cars stopped near ·when·
he wanted them (R 237, 244). He did not remember hm\

close they ·were to the dearanec point (H. 245).
He testified concerning the natnre of the :>top a~
follows: "\Vel!, it was severe. Severe." (R. 238). And
again: "Q. As compared to the customary >~top or a
train of this type, on this track with thi~ movement,
was it severe or easy1 " * * A. 1 would :my it wa.;,;
severe, yes."

He further testified that at tlw time he gave the
stop signal there remained plenty of room on the track
for the train to have made an easy ;.;top (U.. 23D).
'l'here was abundant evidence from which the JUr~·
eould have found that thcYe wa,; no need for tl1e stop
to have been so violent.
The two air braking systPms which could have been
used in stopping the train were the automatic, or tmi11
hrakeo;, and the independent~ or engine brakes. The automatic brakes apply brake preso:ure to the ·wheels on tlw
entire train, including the engine and the caboose. 'l'lw
independent brakes apply brake pres,;ure only to the
wheels of the engine, and if there is sla<.'k in the train
this slack will run in when o;aid brakes are used alonP
(R 168). Plaintiff gave his opinion 1hat the engineer
had Uiled the independent rather than the autornatie
brakes and that tlLis accounted for the violPnce of tlw
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~lack action (R. 137,138, til9, Ji(i, 177, liS).

W onmwott testified that in hi,-; opinion t}u: independent rather than the train brake~ had been used. lle
based his opinion on experience and the fact that the
head end of the tralli seemed to ,;top all of a sudden
before the cars did (R. 206, 230).
\Vonnacott also testified that "he can apply the air
where it gradually stops those cars" (R. 1:2li).
Serassio was of the same opinion, testifying agam
and again that j r the customary procednrf' of using the
automatic rather than the independent air had been

followed the stop would not have been so severe (R
250, 251, 234, 2:17, 259, 282, 28:\). Serassio further tf'stil"ied that he actually saw from the lack of piston travel
that the independent rather than the automatic brakes
had been used (R. 259).
Plaintiff was not prepared for the ~lack action for
two rea~:;ons. First, he thought the train wa~:; lea\-iug town.
Second, he did not expect ,;lack action of the degree of
violence that occurred. )i]ormal slack rwtion, in his opinion, would not have caUiled him to be injured (R. 1::'1.
128, 171).
Following the accident plaintiff left the train. went
to the yard office and reported hi~ injury. He then
returned to the train and proceeded lo Thi~tle. a distance
of approximately 20 mile», at whirh point he wa~ relieyed
(R. 140, 1+1). He suffered a ruptured intervertebral
di;;e 11hieh later required a fusion op02-ration with i'f'~nltSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ant permanent partial dio:ability (R 85, 8(), 81, SS).
STATI<JMENT OF POJK'J'8
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY GIVUG INSTRUCTION NO. 20.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COl:RT COliil\UTTED PREJUDJ.CIAL
ERROR BY GIVING 1:-.TSTRUCTION NO. 19.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDIOAL
ERROR BY GIVING INSTRCCTION NO. 20.

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT COJ'ITMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY GIVING I!'<STRUCTION KO. 23.
POINT V.
THE T.itiAL COURT COMMITTED
ERROR BY GIVIKG INSTRUCTION NO. 24.

PREHTDICIAI.

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COlJRT COC\fMITTED PREJCDICIAL
ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 21.
POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR WHEN IT STRUCK 'l'HF. Eh'TIRE TESTIMOKY
OF THE WITNESS PAUL FRANK THOMAS.
ARGUME~T

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 25.
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:For convenience of the Court, Tnstrudion :'\o. :23

lS

herein set fortll:
''l'lainti.ff in the exen·ise or reasoi1able care
is required hy the saf<"ty rules of 'I' he Denver and
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company to proteet him~Plf again;;t injury a;:; far a~ possible fr?m
jerks, slack action or any other unexpected motion
by keeping a finn grip and a secure foothold
when riding on or in moving equipment."
Instruction No. 25 is defendant's requested InstructioH No. 9. CouTISC] for plaintiff made the following exception to f.laid instruction:

"Plaintiff objects to the giving of Instruction
~a. 25 on the grounds that it states that plaintiff,
in the exercise of reasonable care, is required hy
the safety rules of the Denver &. Rio Grande
Railroad Company to protect himself against
injury, as far as possible, from jerks, slack action,
or any other unexpected motion by keeping a
finn grip rutd secme foothold when rid.ing on
moving equipment, on the grounds and for the
reason that the plaintiff would not be required,
under the law, to proteet. him."ell' against unexpected motions of the 1ype indicated, and the
rules of the company cannot be made contrary to
the rules of law and become a ,;tandard of care
to be imposed upon its own i!mployees, for the
n:a;;on that it can be Pasily sctm that ."\Wit rule6
could be made which would make them negligent
regardless of what they did; and to say that they
are negligent for not anticipating unexpected motions goes too far, and is an incorrect statement
of the law.'' (R. 351, 352).
In conjunction with Instruction

~o.

1.5 wlrieh re-
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quires plaintiff to expert the unc;,;pected ·we rall attention
to Instruction .1\o. 17 (a) which allows the jury to find
not only that plaintiff was contributorily negligent but
that hi:; contributory negligCM'P was the sole proximate
cause of his own injuriP~.
'l'hr< lm\· i~ clear that it 1~ not negligence for one to
fail to anticipate and guard against harm which can
come solely through the negligent ads of another person
or persons.

See Brune1· v . .ilfcCaxthy, et aL, 105 Utah 399, 40G.
142 P. 2d G49, where the court <dated:
"'" " " Where the accident has been caused
hy the failure to give ::<uch signal the party working in a crew responsible for such omission ·will
not be heard to say that the injury suffered eould
have been avoided had the injured party conducted himself on thP. assumption that the signal
would not be given; that the consequence,: of the
delict could have been avoided had the injured
party, as avpears from hindsight, so conducted
or positioned himself as to make the delict. incon;,equential"
And in MathetDS v. Daly West M-ining Co., 2./ L-tah
193,75 P. 722 (1904), the court stated:

"It io: also ·well settled that the negligence of
the master is not among the risks so assumed by
the servant. Therefore when the servant, in the
discharge of his duti.es, is in a position which is,
under the conditions which then exist, naturally
safe, but is suddenl;.· made dangerom; by the
negligence of the master, and the injury to the
servant is immediately caused thereby, the master
. l .mb le."
Js
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In McCulloch
tbe court stated:

1:.

Horto-n, (~1ont.), 56 P. 2d 1344,

"'T'lrc failur·e to anticipate negligence which
results in injury is not negligence and will not
defeat the action for the injury sustained. 20
R.C.L. 118: Central Railroad Co. v. De Buslcy
(C.C.A.) 261 F. 561; Wagner v. Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Co., 252 Pa. 354-, 97 A. 411; ::\ orth
Bend Lumber Co. v. Seattle, 116 Wash. 500, 199
P. 9RS, 19 A.L.R. 415."
Tn GnJenwood L Summers, et al., (Cal.) 149 P. 2d
35, the eourt recognized the rule in the following lan-

guage:
''The general rule is that every person who
i~ himself exercising ordinary rare has a right
to preomme that every other person will perform
his duty and obey the law, and in the absence of
reasonable ground to think otherwise it is not
negligence to assume that he is not exposed to
danger whirh comes to him only from violation
or law or dtlly by such other person. See Harris
v. Johnson, 1916, 1'7! Cal. 55, 5~. 161 P. 1155,
L.R.A. 1917C, 477, Ann. Ca.s. 19l~K 560: Pinelln
v. Taylor, 1933, US ·Cal. App. 508, 51:?, 17 P. ~d
1039."
See also Piue!lo n. Taylor (Cal.) 17 P. :.'d 1039,
Bowers. et u.1·. r. Foster ct ux., ("Wash.) ~OS P. 107:!;
Beck v. Sirot.a (Cal.) 109 P. :?d H9; and Hechler rt al r.
McDonnell, (Cal.) 109 P. 2d ±:!G.
The primary vice of Instruction Xo. :23 is that plaintil'£ is required to anticipate and guard against all un~''>Pl'eli•\1 jerks, regardless of their origin or severity.
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Even tlwugh smooth operation would normally be expected, and a jerk orrm·<>, plaintiff mu~t 1''-J1f-'r:t the jerk
because an operating rule ol' the Denver & Hio Grande
Hailroad Co. so decrees. lle must expect a stop from a
sudden failure of equipment., a holt of lightning, or tl1e
negligent act of a fellow employee because the railroad
has a rule to that effect. And if he dorsn 't expect the
~tnexpected he 1~8 negligent as a matter of law. Even
though a reasonably prudent pcr~on under the circumstances would not expect a jerk, this paintiff must expect
a jerk because his employer has enacted a rule. This if'
the first case to our knowledge in which a trial eourt
has ever permitted a railroad company to repeal an act of
Congress. And we call the Court's attention to the fact'
th.at defense coun::;el led the trial court into this ridiculous error with his Requested Instruction No. 9.
Instruction ~o. :2.) al:-~o reviYP>< tlw outlawed defen~f·
of assumption of risk.
In the year 1939 Congress amended the Wederal
Employers' Liability Art and abolished the dod r·ine ol'
assumption of r·i;.;k as a dcfe11;.;e . .J-J r.S.C.A. Section J~
read8 as follows:
"§34. A"'::mmption of ri8ks of employment..
In any action brought against any common carrier
under or by virtue of any of the provisions of
this chapter to recover damages for injuries to,
or the deatlt ol', any of its employees, such emplnyeP shall not he held to have assumed the risks
of his employment in any case where such injury
or death resulted in whole or in part from thP
nr~digenre of any of the officer;;, agenJ, or em-
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ployees or such carrier; and no eu:ployee shall be
held to have assumed lbe ri:,k::i of h1,.; employcment
in anv case where the violation by such common
carri~r of any siatutc enacted for tlJe safety of
emplovees contributed to the injury or death of
.:<11d1 Crnployec. ~\pr. ~2, 1908, c. 149 § 4, 3~. Stat.
G6; Aug. 11, 19:39, c. 6Sfi § 1, 53 Stat. 1±0±. ·
'T'he leading case decided b~- the 1'nited Stales Supreme Court interpreting the a1JOve statute is Tiller 1:.
Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 318 L~- S. 34, KT L. Ed. 610,
fm S. Ct. 44~, '\·herein the hackgroTIJld of the doctrine of
assumption of risk is discussed and the court concludes
in the following historic language;

.. 'l'he doctrine of asswnption of risk cannot be
'abolished i11 toto' and still remain in partial
existance as the court below suggest.;. The theory
that a servant i~ completely barred from reeovery
for injury resulting from his master's negligence,
which legislatures have sought to eliminate in all
it~ yarious forms of contributor~· negligence, the
fellow servant ruk, and assumption of risk, rnru;t
nut, contrary to the 'A-ill of Congn'~~- be allowed
recrudescence under an;- other label in the common
law k-'>icon * * "' • ."
A number of cases haYe followed the lead of the
Tiller case, supra, in holding- the line agrunst efforts on
the part of various lesser courts to limit and cireumseribe the intent of Congre~~ when it abolished the de·fense of a,gsumption of risk. We (•ite Thonw..s, Appellant,
1', f!nio-11 Railuvi1J Company, _!ppcllee, (Sixt11 Cir. Oct.
14, 1fl5--l-) 216 F. ~d 18, where the trial eourt attempted
to eliminate recover~· by plaintiff if h.e knell' a.ud If!!-'
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Hwurt of danger ercutcd by negligence of tiie defendant
and even in that ::;ituation the appellate court reversPd
and held that such knowledge on plaintiff'~ part wa:<
not a defem;e under the Federal Employers' Liability

Act. The court ::;tatcd:
"The trial court charged the jury that the
railroad \Vas not liable for injuries sustained
from dangers that were obvious or as well known
to the injured party as to the- railroad; and that
if the jury found from the evidence a dangerous
condition of the concrete floor near the foreman':;
office, in the roundhouse, or deficient lighting"
facilities in that place, 'if such dangerous condition exi::;ted, was obvious, or as well kno·wn to
the plaintiff Thomas ao; to the railroad, the de-

fendant would not be liable for injury sustained
from su<:h dangerous condition.' The foregoing
charged the employee with assumption of risk.
~'his was error, as 'every vestige of the doctrine
of assumption of risk was obliterated from the
law (the Federal Employers' Liability Act) by
the 1939 amendment.' Tiller v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 318 L<.S. 54, 58, 63 S. Ct. 444, 446,
87 h Ed. 610. Even though the employee may
know that the employer has been negligent in the
furnishing of a safe place to work, the employee
does not, under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, assume the risks of such danger. Williams v.
Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 5 Gir. 190 ]'. 2d 744,
748.''

In Texas a.nd Pacific Railway Company v. Bnckles,
(Sixth Cir. decided Apr. 6, 1956), 232 F. 2d 257, certior~
ary denied, 76 S. Ct.1052, defendant reque11ted an instruction in the following language:
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"Where an l'tnployee or a eomntOn c:arrier_by
railroad operating in interstate commc~ce fiiltt(·~
patcs the risk resulting frorn tlw po~<nble neghg-cnce of a fellow employe1.', or should under the
circmnstances anticipate such risk, and dceides
to duuwc tlntt particular risk, he ennnot T"Ceover
for an injury re~ulting from such negligence.
Therefore, if you fim] that complainant anticipated, or should have anticipated, the impad resulting from the coupling attempt and knew, or
should have known, of the risk inherent in such
an attempt and chanced that risk, your verdict
mu;:.t be for the defendant."

'rhe appellate court ~n~tained the trial court in refusing
said instruction in the following language:
"Specification 5 is that the trial court erred
in refusing to give o;peeial charge 8 requested by
defendant. In the case relied on by appellant,
Owens v. T:nion Pacific Railway Co., footnote 6,
supra, the Supreme ·Court spoke of what remained
of the defense of assumption risk prior to the
1939 amendment to the Federal Employrro;' Lia·
billty Act abolishing that defemP. now ..j.;) e.s.c.•\..
§54. The accident in that ease occurred before
the enactment of that a111endment, but :<nit \\"ll.~
brought flrtenuuds. B.r that amendment 'e-.ery
vestige of the doctrine of ass11mption of risk was
obliterated .from the law.' ~'iller v. A-lnan!ic Coa,;l
Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58, G3 S. ("(. ill. 446, 87
L. Ed. GlO. Charge ~ was, then•!'ore, properly
refused."

In Joh11son !'. F:ril:' Railroad Compa11y, (2 Cir. de·
cided Oct. 6, 1956) 236 F. 2d ;;52, tJw court. faced \Yith
a problem sinrilar to !hat in the CH6P at bar, stated:
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"ln addition, we think the court stated Uw
is;,ue of contributory negligence to the jury in
:;uch terms that it might be thought that as;,umption or the ri::;k was a good defense, contrary to
45 l~.S.C.A. §54. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line
R Co., :318 C.S. 54, 63 S. CL 444, 87 L. Ed. 610.
The relevant portion of the charge was as follows:

"'Now, as to the question of contributory
negligence, ·which ha::; been talked a1Jout in this
case: Owen ,Johnson had been working part time,
it is true, but he had been doing this job befor!:'.
ls there anything thai he did at the tirne that
contributed to it·! H c knew what his cowJition ·was.
Ile testified that U1e slightest bang on this bone
might bo an aggravation of this condition. He
dairn~ he ·wasn't warned and that that violated
their rule by not warning him. But Del Guidice,
his own witness, Jbtified that it was a nonnal
coupling that happened every night, and pre::;wn,
ably every night the.~- didn't ><tov to warn hiw
herfmse it was so gentle that nobody \VUfl pushed
around. _\t least, you will be entitled to infer
that from t11e h·.~timony of Del Oudire.'
''From this it might. have been thought tlw.t
it was permissible to inler that. be('ause on other
occa.'lions when the plaintiff was at work the
locomotive crew did not warn the ma.il ear oecupanb, the plaintilf had a~surncd the risk>\ of an
unexpeetcd eoupling of normal force. The specific
cxf.'eption to thiil passage ·wa~ well taken.''
The magnitude of the error committed by the trial
court in giving Instmction No. 25 becomes apparent upon
a moment of reriertion. If, b.1 enarting an operating
rulE', 1he railroad company could immuni7.e it~(·lf against
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act;; whieh otherw-ise \\·ouhl be negligem~e, it conld effectively eliminate all rights ut recovery hy railroad employees which have been :;o jealously guarded hy our
LTniled States Supreme ·Coul't and other appt>llatc conrU
in recent ye.ars. For p_xample, a milroad could enact a
rule thai. emJlloyec:; should g-uard again~t and Pxped
ummfc hflml brake,;, and tlm~ prevent recove1;.- for violation of the hand brake provisions ol' the Safety Appliance
Act. A similar rule <'ould be enacted to immunize the
railroad against UJI,'" conceivabl(' nq~ligence or violation
of the Safety Appliance Acts by a railroad company.
lYe do not believe that the Supreme Court of this
~tate will ever ~erionsl;.- entertain establi,;hing a precedPnt that would in effeet delegate to railroad companies
tbe power to modify, or circumvent the established law
of the land simply by enactment of an operating rule.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. l'!l.

For ('onvenien<>e of the Court Tn:::tnwtion Xo. 19 is
herein set forth:
Ino;tru('tion Xo. 19
''You are instructed that <'Ouplers between
railroad ear~ of necessity have ~<orne pia_,. or free
action between them whi(·h result;:. in ;:.mne jerking
01· jarring pf the ear.~ whenever they are stopped
or started or 1he ~peed of their lUOYf'luent ('han!l;ed,
an~ t~i~ slaek ac!ion may occur even though -the
tntm 1s operated m a <'areful and prudent mannPr.
'l.'he plain1 iff cannot. therPfore, re<'O\'f'r any
damages in this artion unless he pruYes Jw a
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['l"I'\HIJidNanee of the evidence that the train of
,·ar~

on which he
have fallen in the

a manner as to

riding when he claims to
rahoo~e >nt,.; operated in such

\HI><

eau~e

an unexpected jarring or

jerkin;; of unusual and unnecesr:.ar)· iOcvcrilv and
that he wa~ caused to fall in the caboose b~· such
unexpected, unusual jarring or jerking of the
caboose."
lt will be noted that [nstrnrtion :\o. liJ is defendant'~
rPqne~ted Instruction .1\o. 1. Counsel for plaintiff exrppted to o;aid in,.;lnwtion in the rollowing language:

"" ~ ' ~ by this instruction the ronrt rPJ"tnires
the jury to find that the jarring or ,jerking ·was
hoth nnexpeded and unsually and unnecessarily
\·iolcnt; and under the law, either an unexpected
jarring or an unusual and unnecP.ssary severity
'i\·ould be sufficif'nt for recovf'ry by plaintiff."
Counsel also citf'd the case of Ayres r. The Union
Pacific Railroad Compam1 (dceided .Jan. f:i, 1941) 111
nah 104, 176 P. :!d 161 (R. 347).
'l'hf' f'rror contained in lnst.ruction No. 19 can best
he ~een by rderence tu certain faets esta!Jlished by the
t>videnec in the case. Attention is called to the testimony
of plaintiff, -Wonnacott and Sera~sio t.hat the ~lack action
and resulting jerk of the caboose was unmmally and
unneceso:arily Revere (R 128. 129, ~2:1, 226, 230, 237,
2:1~. 2--1---1-, 245), and that said ~Pverity wa~ aecounted for
by the engineer using the independent rather than the
automatic brakes. And engineer Kroescher testifif'd that
tl~e of thP independent brnlms for this kind of stop was
nt>ithPr rustomary nor proper.
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'i'he Ayre8 case, supra, and the ease of Missouri rae.
R. Co. t:. Keeton, ;20/ Ark. 793, Ul3 S. W. :2d 505, 326
U.S. 689, 66 S. Ct. 135, Rhmd for tlJe proposition that
either of two different kind;; of jerks or stops will ·warrant a finding of negligence on the part of a railroad
company, the first being a stop which is not reasonably
to be expected in the light of the circumstances surrounding the movement, and tlte second being a stop which,
even if expected, iB unusually and unnecessarily <iolent.
This court, in the Ayres case, stated:
'·The case of Missouri Pac. R.. Co. v. Keeton,
207 Ark. 793, 18:> S. W. 2d 505; Keeton v. Thompson, :326 U.S. 689, 66 S. {'t. 1:-!3, i~ one of tlte
latest caser; on the subject. In that case there 'ra~
a confliei between the parties as to whether or
not there \\ tb a sudden jerk at or about the time
of the coupling. The k~timony that there was,
re.,;ted almost entirely upon statements or the deceased that there waR a Rudden hard <~top and he
waR jerked off. The <~top wa~ characterized as
one of the harde,;t tl1e witnes~ had ~een. '!'he
Arkan,.;rt;; Supreme Court refused to ~ubmit the
m;;e to the jury. 'l'lie Supreme Court of the Pnited
State~, however, held that there was sufficient
to go to the jury. eomparing that case with fh(
present it is probably fair to say that a sudden
stop ur .ierk at o timr n-hrn ·'·nwnlh motion i:o· to
IJe anticipated- ,as in the prestnt case_ ;_,. et·r11
worse tban u l1ord -'tnp at or neat· the time a sfnp
of 8(11!1t kind is to be mlfiripatPd.''

\Vherc Jlw trial eourt n~1uired "an unexpected jarring or jerking- of unusual and unnece~;;a 1 T
. ~pn•rih"
.,
the burden wn~ placl?d upon the plaintiff of eRtabli~hing
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not nnh· that the ~top ·was unu6ually and unnecessarily
severe, hut that no ;.,(op wa~ reasonably to be expected
by plaintiff. An cx_peded stop could be of the seve-rest
nature imaginable, and could 1Je cam;ed by the gravest
kind of neglect, hut plaintiff still couldn't recover under
this im;truction.
Instruction )J"o. ]9 practieally arnounted to a directed verdict when eonsidcred in the light of the unrair
written statement obtained from plaintiff shorly after
the accident where appear the following ·words: "Sometimes they cut them in before we pull up, so when the

start is made ·we ;just continue out. of town, and other
1inK~s they handle it in the manner done on this datf'.
Either way is proper and usual." See J-<jxhibit 12.
"\"\Thether or not plaintiff expected the stop could
only go to his contributory negligence which is not a
defense. See PadVlla r. Alchi't'l,son, T. & S. Ry. Co., (1!l56)
295 P. 2d ]023, 61 ~- Jl.f. 115; Thomas, Appelant, v. Union
Railway Company, Appellee, fmpra. Rut in Instruction
:\'o. 19, where the court 15tates that plaintiff can recover
nothing unleRo: the stop was unexpected, the words "in
11·hole or in part" are eliminated from the Federal Employers Liability i'l_ct and the do<:trinc of contributor~r
•

rl<!'/ IV<td

neghgencc is ,rQVHlwed as a eDmplete defense. Furiherrnore, Instruction X o. 19

reviw~s

the doctrine of

a~sump

tion of risk as a complete' dei'cnse wherever and whenever a stop of o:ome kind should be ·expPderl.
The instruction also eliminates plaintirf's right to
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recover if the stop, although normal, \\Tas not rea~onabl~
to be expected. 1t will be recalled that plaintiff a,.;sumed
the train wa,.; leaving town, and started for the rear of
the caboose. A jury could find that this assumption
wa~ reasonable in view of other evidence that a ~econd
stop would involve excessive and Ullllecessary slack
action. Certainly plaintiff was entitled to aso;ume tlrnt
his fellow employees would not subject him to an unreasonable risk of harm.
POINT Ill.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 20.

PR~JUDICIAL

l!'or convenience of the Court Instruction Ko. 20
is herein set forth:
Instruction K o. 20
"Slack action is an ordinary and usual incident in the handling of freight trains. Therefore, the fact that there was slack action, -even
though it may have been severe, at the time of
plaintiff's injury, does not in and of itself establish negligence on the part of the Railroad. Before
you can find the Railroad negligent, you must
find by a preponderance of the evidence that tlw
engineer failed to make an ordinary, nonnal and
reasonable stop when he- acted on the signal of
the brakeman Serassio."

Instruction No. 20 is defendant's requested Instruction 1'\o. 16. This instruction confines plaintiff e-xclusive·
ly to the manner in whirh the engineer made the sto}l
when "he acted on the signal of the brakeman Serassio,''
and eliminates plaintiff'~ contention that the making of
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the :otop at all o:ould have been found by the jury to be
negligence on the part ol' the railroad co1npan,\·. Defendant\ own witw·~~e,; testiried that severe and r.onsequently dangerous slaek adion \l"il~ a ne<'es~ary incident
to the 20 carlength movement and stop 1rhirh oe1'nrred.
·when thi;.: evidence is coupled to the fact that the movement awl stop eould have easily and pmcticnlly been
avoided by bringing the curs to the train rathc·e than
thr train to the cars, it can be ~een that a substantial part of plaintiff's case was eliminated by the
instruction. We call attention to the case of Bosto-n. &
.1lain Hailrorrd CnWJ#llllf r. Jferch, 156 F. 2d 10!;1, 111
(1 C:C.A. Ccr. den. Oct. 28, 1946, G7 ~- Ct. 124), where
the court held that whenever there i:-; a11 evidentiary
basis for a finding that more could have been done to
promote the safety of employees, a jury question is
eo:tablished on the issue of negligence.
'l'hc instruction also does violence to 1.he dodrine
of res ipsa loquitur. Plainti rr alleged res ipsa in his
('OII!plaint (R. 2). The trial court properly ino:tructed
on re~ ip::!a in Instruction 7\o. 1± and told U1e jury in
effect that severe slack action inadequatE'iy explained
would warrant a finding of negligence.
The cases mpport submission or res ipsa loquitur
to the ,jury. Tn Kan::;as City Sourhern flaihW_i! Company
r-. J1/'fis (Fifth Circuit, Apr. 6, 1956), 2:1~ F. 2rl 267,
GO A.L.R.. ~rl fi:!S. Certiorary denied by the llnited States
Supreme Court, 35~ U.S. 8:13, l L. Ed. 2d 53, 77 :::\. Ct.
-19, a sudden extraordinarily violent jerk oeeurrcd caus-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

24
ing plaintiff':; injuries. 'l'Jte doctrine of rc\,; ipsa loquitur
was held applicable in the following language:

·•We think that the learned di.i!trict court
properly submitted the issue of negligence to the
jurv under the dortrine of 'res ipsa loquitur' as
that rloetrine iii applied in action:-: arising under
the :F'ederal Employers' l.iabilily Act and other
federal laws. 'l'hc instant ca.'W i:-;, we think. a
stronger one for tl1e application of the so-called
res ipsa loquitur doctrine than was the J csionowski ca~e. supra. There the claimed negligence
of the dceeased brakeman might have be-en the
;;ole cause of the derailmen, ·with no other negligence on the part of tl1e railroad. Here, the
most that could be claimed against the plaintiff
i;.; hi<~ failure to ad after being infonned of an
improper distribution of the load primarily
brought about by other employees. 'l'he plaintiff
had no connection 11 i th maintP.nanee of the brake>
or brake line, or 11 ith the handling of the brakeR
in making the ;.;top. I le was entitled to ~over
if his injurr re8ulted 'in ,,-hole or in part from
the negligence of any of the . . . employeeg of
such carrier, or h_,- rpa;..on of any defect or _in.
suffieiency. due to its negligence, in i1;.; ... equip-ment.' 45 L1SCA §51. In tJw present ra>'P, onre
tire jury found a sudden stopping and an unusual
joH or jar from whieh they inferred ncglip.·ence,
such neglig-ence could not be C'lmrgeable solely
to tJ1e plaintiff. If negligent a1 all, his negligence 11·as contributory. not barring a rerovef\
but C'alling for a diminution of daumc;P:-:. --±:1 rSC.-\
§ 53."
.
In Instrudion Ko. :W the jur)- i>< informM that slack
al'tion, en•11 1hough sevf'n•. does llOt in and of it~C'lf.
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establi"'h negligence on the part of the railroad. But
Imtruction );o. 1-J. prO}JCrly told the- jury that 11/j.explained severe slack action would support a finding of
negligence. The two instructions are in('onsistent and
confusing, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur war;
lost to plaintiff in the shuffle. The- burden was placed
on plaintiff of proving that t.hc i<f'\'l'l"c o:lack action was
negligently caused. The burden should have been on
defendant under res ipsa of explaining the severe slack

action on a non-negligent basis.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 23.

For eonvcnience of the Court Instruction

~o.

23 is

herein set forth;
'·Before you can find the Railroad negligent
in this rase you must. find that. the engineer
operating the train failed t.o i]o what an ordinary
wndcot engineer would have done under the cir"
cu mstances."

Instruction Xo. :~n io: defendant's requested Instruction No. 1:;. This instruction contains the same vice
discussed in Point II [ wherein attention is called to a
eombination of fnrts; f.ir~t, that. under defendant's t~.~~li
mony violent and severe c;lark action at the end of the
train was a necessary and unavoidable result of moving
a long train a distance of 18 to 20 carlengt-hs; and se•·ond,
the fact t.hat the movement it~elf could have been practically and simply avoidP..d; and third, that t.he decision
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cott and Serassio and not by the plaintiff. Instruction
No. :2:1 eliminates from plaintiff's rase any contention
that "\Vonnaeott and Scrassio were negligent i11 decifug
to make a movement which would involve umwcessary
and unusual danger to plaintiff. This theory of liability
was properly pleaded by plaintiff where it \IUS alleged
that the stop was unnecessarily violent and not rea~on
ably to be expected.
If a jury in the exercise of it,; broad latitude as the
fact finder could find that the sWp involved an unreasonable risk of harm, and that the stop was unnecessary,

defendant's negligence in making the stop at all would
be a proper jury issue.

See in support of plaintiff';, position Boston & M.
R. H. v. Meech, supra, Wilkrrsotl r. JlcCarthy et al ..

336 U.S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 413, reversing Utah Supreme Court.
187 P. 2d 188, and Murphy r. BosfOtl & Jlai-ue R. R., 65
N.E. 2d 923.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJCDlCIAL
ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 24.

For the convenience of the Court Instru('tion :So.
24 is herein set forth:
"Xegligencp on the part of anyone i~ not to
be inferred fron~ t~w mere faet that the plaintiff
may have hren mJured, and the mcre fru:t tl1at
the plai11tiff may have been injured i:; not evideiJCe in and of itself of negligence on the part
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of the defendant, nor of eontributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff. Xegligence, iJ any,
and eontributol'}' negligence, if any, must he
proved by a preponderance of the evidenee in
this cao:e."
Instruction Xo. 24 nm~t also be considered in the
hght of the fact that this is a res ipsa loquitur ease.
In::~truction l\o. 24 tells the jm·~ that the n1cre l'act that
plaintiff may have been injmed is not "c\'idcnee in and
of it~elf of ncgligenC'c" on t.he part of defendant . .At no
time has plaintiff elairned that the fad plaintiff was
injured est(~bli·shed negligence. Plaintiff's contention
wa~, and is, that the fact he was injured on the caboose
is .,·,nne ct:i'dence indiml ing the violence of the slack action. The violenec ol tlw ::;lack is a fact to be established
in determining whether defendant was negligent.
The law on thi.~ point is stated m 38 American
Jurispruilence beginning at. page 985, m the following
language:
""\Vhile it is true thal simply because an acddent has occurred, negligence is not to be premmed, ;,till, in drtennining the question of negligence, the fad that an a~cidcnt has o~curred may
he and should be taken into consideration, in connection with all otl1er raet:B and circum~tancrs of
the ca!ie, for the purpo~e of determining \\·hether
in faet there was negligence. Negligence may be
inferred from circumstanc.:s omrronnding the in;jury, if not from the fact of the injury itself."
[n the footnote at page 9S5 of 38 Americ(Jn ,]llri.,·pnrdenl'f' appears the following ~upported statE'mcnt:
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•·Xo general rule can be lai? dow!1 that th.e
mere olwurrence of an accident JS or 1:0 not RUIficient prima facic proof of actionable negligem,e.
,._ ~ ~ Griffin v. Boston & A. R. Co-., l!S }fa~.'143, 19 N. E. 166, 1 hR.A.. 698, 12 Am. St. ReJJ.
526.
''Kegligence, like any other fact, may be infcn-cd from the cinmmstances, and the ease may
be such that though there he no positive proof
that the defendant has been guilty of any neglert
of duty, the inference of negligence would be irresi~:;table. Bamowsky v. Helson, 89 .1lieh. 523,
50 X. W. 989, 15 L.H.A. 3:1."

'l'hc prinriple that the happening of the aceidcnt may
be proper proof of neglig<>nee -waH recognized h~- thio
Court in Penin r. r'nion Paei_fic H. Co., 59 l"tah 1, 201
P. 405. IT1 the Perrin msr the happening of the acridcnt
and the facts surrounding it were• found to be sufficient
to support a verdict for plaintiff. See al;:;.o: Patrir/;

Wetter

r.

The AfcJ,ison, Ti,fJPka nnd Sant11 Fe Hp. Cu ..

277 Ill. App. 215; Orri"" 1". ChiWf!O. R. 1. & F. H11. Cv ..
(Mo.) :?14 S.W. 125; 8outhm1 Hp. Co. c. Smith (Ala.)
221 Ala. 273, US S. 22,-:t; Hankins L RPimer.,_ S6 \"ellr.
307, 125 :\T.\V. 516; Pa-ulse11 L MeA roy Rrrwiug Co., :!~!l
Ill. App. 605; Grauer r. Alabama Grfaf SoufliPrll R. Cu ..
209 Ala. 568,96 S. 915: and HackleJJ 1". c'-·'oulhern Pnt-iii<
Co., (Cal.) --1-:'i P. 2d -±47.
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT CQ;\r.:>IJTTED PREJl"DICIAL
ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 'o'l.

For t.Jw eonvenienee of thP Conrt Illf'trnetion \"n.
21 is herein ~rt forti!:
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"If you find that the engineer made an independent application of the brakes, that l'aet, if
yon 60 find, does not in and of itsell estahli~h
negligence on the part of the Railroad. Before
you can find negligence on the rmrt of tJ1e !{ailroad, you mm;t find by a preponderance of Uw
evidence, that avplying the independent air brakes
to stop as signaled by the brakeman Rerm;~io,
consi it.uted negligenr.c and failure to exercise

reasonable care."
[nstruction Ko. 21 i,; defendant'::; requested Instruction Xo. l!i (R.. :2:1). The fallacy of the instruetion can

best be ~een by resort to the evidence. Defendant's own
witnesse,; tcstil'icd that an application of the iTJdependent
brakes would be a departure from c.'Ustom and practice,
would result in ex(·e~.~ive slack action with resultant
violent run-in of ~lack and danger to employees on the
rear of the train. Defendant's position was that the
independent air wa.~ not used in making tho fltop. We
call attention to the tf'stimony ol' engineer Kroescher
at R. ~~1, ~9~:

"Q. Now, 11hcn .1ou are operating a string of
cars in a long train, .:\lr. Kroescher, what
is the usual brake that you m;cf
·· \.
"Q.
"\
"Q.

\Ve generally use the service applieation.
And why do you usc the service appli(·ntion1
So you can ,;top the train.
With a long fltring of carfl, arc you able to
stop the train in a flhort distmJcc with independent brakefl?
"A. Not- no.
·'Q. Why not!
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··A.

Well, it wiU cam;e se·vere slack acti·on, if
?JOU· 1J.~e the inrhpendtmf ulone."

Kroescl1er went on to testify that he used the auto.
matic rather than the independent brakes in making th
stop (R. 296). lie also kstified that the use of the
automatic brakes was the customary and proper pro.
ccdure (R. 295, 305). On cross-examination Kroescher
testified that me of the independent brakes would cause
much more violent slack ad.ion than use of the traill
brakes (R. 308), &nd that he wouldn't use the independent
brakes for reasons of o:afely to personnel on the rear of
the train (R. 309).
With the foregoing e\'identiary background, thE
court states in Instruction No. 21 that PIE'Il though the
jury believed that the independent rather than the trair<
brakes were used, thi,.; fad in and of it~elf would not
establish negligence on the part of the railroad cowpany.
In the light of defendant's 011·n evidence tl1t> u.•p oi
independent ai1· b~· the engineer would be negligence as
a matter of law. 'l'his i1:1 true hef'amt> it i,; agreed on aU
sides that use of independent air would (1) <'alllif' unusual and Ulllleces,;ar~· violence of ~lark artion at tlw
rear of the train, and(:!) he a departure from customar).
noru1al and safe railroading- procedures.
POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR WHEN IT STRUCK THE ENTIRE TESTIMONY
OF THE WITNESS PAUL FRANK THOSIAS
'Yiine~~

Thomas teo:tified on behalf of plaintiff that
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he

wa~

in (}w ,Yard offiee at I he time of the oecUI'I"C·w'P
(R. :!til, :!II:!). The yard office i~ about 50 to 100 feet
from the eastbound mainline track \R. 264). He was
~mnewhat un(•crtain as to whether he had actually ~een
the movement of the train on the eastbound mainline
track (R. :!fi-1-, 26.1). However, he testified that he heard
"a violent run-in," and again rharactcrized the noise he
heard as ''a terriffic crashing, in other words" (R 265).
He also testified that he mw the caboose of the tmin
which was almost in front of the yard offi<'e (R 2fl6).

A short Lime later
office (R. 263).

Thoma~

saw plaintiff enter the yard

'J'he court instructed the jury as follows:
''6 (a) You are imtructed that you are to
entirely disregard the testimony of the witne::;,;
Thomas and are not to con:o.ider ~aid testimony
in arriving at your deci~ion in this case."

Counsel for plaintil'f took exception to the giving
of said instruction (R. 345).
The reason given hy the court. in exduding ~aid
te~timony r,.an be found in his ronmtcnt wherein the
court stated; "\Veil, it takes rat.hcr a strong a:o.sumption
to say that the l'rash he said he heard had anything to
do with tlli;; train or this event." (R. 272).
That eYidenee is admist;able even though it may
im·nlve a measure of speculation ha~ long been the law
in Federal Employers' Uabllity Act cases. As was stated
by this Court in Co ray v. Ogden Union R<1-!1lway & JJepot
Cnm pam], 1 ~() P 2d 342, at Page :J-4--l:
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'·If there is evidence from wl1ich the jury,
as reasonable lllen, can find the e.ristem·e of a
disputed fact, it is not speculation Hiinply becaust·
there is equally strong evidence from which they
could have arrived at an opposite conclusion. The
law of the "Gniierl States covering thi::; situation
is as stated by Mr. Justice Douglas in the ease of
Ellis v. L"nion Pacific Railroad Co., 67 S. Ct. 591<.
600:
'''l'he choice of confliding versions of the
·way the accident happened, the decision a~ to
which witnc::;s was telling the truth, the inferrwe~
to be drawn from unru1d·rorerted a.~ ~rell as controverted fads, ano questions for the j1ay. 'l'ennant v. Peoria & P. TT. R. Co., 3:Zl r.S. 29, 64
S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520: Lavender v. Kuru,
supra, (3:Z7 P.S. 645, 6G S. Ct. 1-±0, 90 L. Ed. 916).
Once there i~ a reasonable basis in the record
for concluding that there was negligence which
rnused the injury it ii' irrelevant that fair-minded
mf'u might reach a different. conclusion. For then
it would he an invasion of the jury';: function for
an appellate court to draw contrary i.nferen~e'
or to conclude that a different conclusion would
be more reasonable. Lavender Y. Kurn, supra.
W.!/ r.s. at page G.•,:?. 6G S. Ct at page 7-±:1 (90
LEd. 91G)."
And as \\'a~ :;nid lo.' ~Jr .•Jmticf'
v. K urn, 3~7 U.~. ii4J. 66 S. Ct. I +tl:

:\[urph~-

in Lorrud,·•

''Tt i~ no answer to :;ay that the jm·y·~ verdict
involved SJH.'<'ulatiml and eonjf'eture. Whenever
fact,; nrc in dispute or tire eridel/(e is suth 1/wt
_fai1·-wiuded 1111'11 lllfi.IJ rlnnc di_ifrreut iuji'I'I'Hrt'··.
a measun• of speeulation and conjecture is required on the pal't of those \dh,~t' dut' it i~ to
settle tlw disputf' by rhoosi.ng what seen~s to them
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tobr. h
t e most rea;;ona bl e ·
m erence.
r"
1n ihe ca::;e at bar the jury should have been allowed,
from the proximity of time and location, to infer that
the run-in of slack hearo:l by 'l'homas >va.;; on plajntiff'o;
train, and from the nature of the ~ound, that it was
unmmally violent. "\Vhen the trial <'onrt disapproved
and excluded this testimony a c;hadow wa.'l placed over

plaintiff's entire case.
The trial court ·waR not content v..ith exduding the
evidence regarding mund of the slack hut excluded the
entire testimony of Thomas. Thoma:>' description of
plaintiff shortly after the accident was as follows: ""\Yell,
I don't recall ·what he looked like exactly. Seemed, though,
he walked in and he \I'H~ white and he had one armdon't recall which elbow was torn out and he wa.'\ sick,
or he said he was sick." (R. 26.1). Thi,; evidence indir.ated
a ~erious injury immediately follo-wing the run-in of
~lar_ok. It was evidt>nCE' of pain and ~uffcring and was
aho ,;upportive of plaintiff'" dairu that hi,; later di::>covered ruptured dise 1'13:3 ranscd b.v the accident. It will
be rer.alled def'endant denied that plaintiff was injured
and contended that the di6c pathology had nothing to
do with plaintiff's accident. For example, note de-fense
counsel'~ ero~s-exnmination of Dr. Robert Lamb (H.
101, 102):

"Q. In other word,;, Doctor, when thi<~ condition gets to the breaking point, the straw that
breaks the back, t.hat can cause the ,;ymptoms to
begin to occur, 1s that ri_ghtl
"A. In some cases.
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"Q. People mlling over awkwardly in bed
with a back like that, they will start having pain l
"A. T have seen it from people who arf
bending ovet' to ltwc their shoes or going through
some wotion that t h e ;.· do-n't ordinarily go
through."

"Q. Doctor, is it not true that people with
a bac·k like this as they get a little older, why
that baC'k will have to be corrected without injury
si1nply because it develope~ and the condition be<:omes worse!
"A. Ye~. "' * * "
Again, on recross, defense counsel attempted to in-

ject doubt as to whether plaintiff was injured at the
time of the accident (R. 115).

"Q. In other words, Doctor, you are asswning that the plaintiff is corr<:'dl~- telli1t~ you that
he has never had any pain in his baek prior to
this time and that the first time he ever had pall
in hif< ha<'k was aftE'r thi~ areident ocf.'urred at
Provof
''A. Yes, that \m~ the history that I "Q. And you have to n~~UllW that to be trut
to read1 tl1e dinp:no~io; tllat you rearhed.
"A.

..,l

E'~.

,.

The te><timony of 'l'homa,;
i~~nt>o<

wn.~

cau~ntion,

and dam·
age. One or more of tlle><E' is~ues wu~ 1-esolved against
bative on tlw

of neglige-nre,

lllaterlul and pro·

plaintiff by tlw jur~·. T'nquestionahly plaintiff wa>
prejudiced hy Instruction X o. G k
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CONCijFSlON
Plaintiff re;.;pcdfully submits that the instructions
given to the jury by the trial court are riddled with
prejudicial error. ln brief s1m1mary these instructions:

1. Erroneously required plaintiff to expect and
guard agaimt unexpected and unanticipated negligence
of the defendant.
Resurrected the outlawed defense of assumption
of risk where it required plaintiff to assume the risks
1..

of unexpected negligent stops.
3. Erroneously deprived plaintiff of the right to
recover for a negligently r-aused severe stop if it was
expected, thereby re.surreeting contributory negligence
as a complete defense.
4. /<Jnoneously deprived plailltiff of the right to
rooover for a negligently 1mexpected stop if there wru; a
nonnal type of braking applieation.
u. .l<jrroneously deprived plaintiff of the right to
recover under the Doctrine of Res Ips.a Loquitur.

G. l<'.rroneou;,ly deprived plainf1ff of the right to
recover even though he proved that other members of
his crPw had made a ,;top which involved an unrca~on
abl~> risk of harm and which ·was unnecessary.

i. Erroneously instructed the jury that use by the
f'11ginee-r of the independent brakes was noi enough to
support a finding of negligence.
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8. Erroneously deprived plaintiff of the advantagp
of important probative evidence when it excluded the
testimony of Thomas.
Any of the foregoing enors individually would warrant reversal of the case. Collectivel;. they demonstrat€
a denial to plaintiff of his fundamental right to a fair
and impartial trial according to law.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that tills ca.<e
should be reversed and renmnded to tl1e District Court
fGr a new trial.

Hcspretfully submitted,
RAI\TLJNGS. \Y.ALLACE.
ROBERTS & BLACK

By Wayne L. Black
Cottnsel _for Appe/fa11f

5:m Judge Building
Salt Lake City. Uah
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